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Abstract — This paper examines two parallel case studies to 
promote remote medical consultation in Ghana.  These projects, 
initiated independently by different researchers in different 
organizations, both deployed ICT solutions in the same medical 
community in the same year.  The Ghana Consultation Network 
currently has over 125 users running a Web-based application 
over a delay-tolerant network of servers. OneTouch 
MedicareLine is currently providing 1700 doctors in Ghana with 
free mobile phone calls and text messages to other members of 
the medical community. We present the consequences of (1) the 
institutional context and identity of the investigators, as well as 
specific decisions made with respect to (2) partnerships formed, 
(3) perceptions of technological infrastructure, and (4) high-level 
design decisions. In concluding, we discuss lessons learned and 
high-level implications for future ICTD research agendas. 
Index Terms — Remote medical consultation.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
ICTD research focuses primarily on matters relating to its 
target populations and their conditions, such as how 
individuals, communities and institutions interact with 
technology.  For the most part, investigators only become part 
of the scene as objects of retrospective critique, usually in the 
context of having failed to see some vital point and achieve 
some critical goal.  As with any kind of research, however, 
ICTD research is a product of social, cultural and professional 
influences on the investigators, influences that affect every 
decision made over a project’s lifetime.  It is extremely 
difficult to reflect upon the effects of these influences because 
each project is so uniquely framed by the contexts of its 
investigators and its target setting that it is hard for analysts to 
imagine how “it could have been otherwise” [19].   
In this paper, we address this reflective gap through a side-
by-side analysis of two completely independent projects which 
arose from similar objectives but resulted in two very different 
strategies. Two sets of researchers came to the same country to 
work with the same community, identified the same problems, 
and proposed two different solutions.  Both projects were 
implemented over the course of 2007-2008, both aimed to 
tackle remote medical consultation among Ghanaian doctors, 
and both sought nationwide deployment over the course of the 
project lifetime. However, the Ghana Consultation Network 
(GCN) was initiated by a group of technologically-oriented 
researchers, while the OneTouch MedicareLine (ML) was 
initiated by a public health researcher and social entrepreneur. 
GCN’s solution consisted of a Web application hosted on a 
delay-tolerant network of computers running in each hospital 
and on the open internet.  ML focused instead on a mobile 
phone program involving a combination of technological 
services and business innovation. We discuss the rationale 
behind decisions made by each party over the course of the 
project and the resulting outcomes. 
The main contribution of this paper is to reflect on some 
ways in which the context and background of researchers 
affect the structure of ICTD projects.  A second contribution is 
in identifying relevant factors which will assist in the design 
and execution of ICTD projects in the future. In particular, we 
provide specific examples of how an investigator’s 
institutional context and identity affect not only the 
methodology used but also the interpretation of findings; how 
the partnerships chosen for co-development and co-
deployment have a fundamental role in the development and 
deployment of the technology; how ‘objective’ assessments of 
existing technology infrastructure are influenced by personal 
areas of expertise; and how projects can be designed with 
various degrees of technological ‘specificity’ and the resulting 
implications for their impact on various development 
indicators. We expect these findings to be of interest to the 
community of ICTD researchers and practitioners as a whole. 
The paper is organized as follows. We first present a 
background overview of some of the underlying issues of 
healthcare in Ghana and briefly introduce both projects.  We 
then discuss in turn the framing of the research problem and 
how it affected the partnerships formed and resulting 
deployment strategies; the assessments of technological 
infrastructure by the project members; and the usage and 
appropriation of the two solutions. Finally, we discuss high-
level implications for ICTD research and present works 
related to each of these sections. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
In this section, we highlight some of the background issues 
of healthcare in Ghana and provide an overview of the two 
projects which are the focus of our case studies.  
A. Healthcare in Ghana 
Like many other countries, Ghana has a tiered healthcare 
system in which cases that cannot be handled by an institution 
at a given tier are referred to institutions above it in the 
hierarchy. All referral chains culminate in one of two teaching 
hospitals, both located in the South, where specialists have the 
training and resources necessary to carry out more complex 
procedures. Doctors, and in particular specialists in areas such 
as internal medicine, are highly concentrated in the urban 
South.  This sometimes leaves only two or three doctors to 
serve in district hospitals in the rural North; predictably, rural 
doctors are confronted with heavy workloads (meaning they 
can spend only a few minutes face-to-face with a given patient 
per day) and isolated working environments (which prevent 
them from taking advantage of many of the educational and 
collaborative programs available to doctors in the South). 
Formal and informal consultation is highly integrated into 
the life of all doctors. Between hospitals, many doctors call 
personal contacts – friends, colleagues, classmates – to seek 
advice, and within hospitals this behavior is even more 
frequent.  Such “curb-side” consultation has long been a 
common observed characteristic of medical practice [16] but it 
is of critical importance in environments where specialist 
expertise is spread thinly.  
Continuity of care is difficult to ensure. Patient records are 
almost universally paper-based. Despite attempts by some 
major hospitals to transition towards an electronic system, 
none of the 18 hospitals visited had a working system. Within 
a major hospital, there is nothing to guarantee complete 
patient records besides a doctor’s own discretion and multiple 
reminders from administration. It is not uncommon for records 
to be lost, confused, or incomplete. 
The communication infrastructure in the country is severely 
limited.  Hospital landlines are frequently out of service, 
forcing many doctors to rely on personally-purchased mobile 
phones. Likewise, broadband Internet infrastructure is 
unevenly available, frequently unreliable where available, and 
dependent on hospital budget allocations. Other options are 
available throughout the country, such as dial-up, satellite, and 
mobile data plans, but these are generally expensive, 
unreliable, and/or slow as well. 
B. The Ghana Consultation Network (GCN) 
Solution 
GCN is an end-to-end, computer-based system providing 
doctor-to-doctor medical consultation on a network of servers 
implementing a distributed, asynchronously-synchronized 
database (Figure 1) [20].  The goal is to allow doctors 
throughout Ghana to consult with each other as well as 
medical professionals (in particular, the large Ghanaian 
medical diaspora) around the world.  Doctors access the 
system through a Web-based UI (Figure 2), either by logging 
into a local server (hosted at some participating hospitals) or 
by logging into one of the two public servers (hosted with 
Internet service providers (ISPs) in both Ghana and the U.S.).  
Providing local servers ensures availability and responsiveness 
to the users in the face of unreliable network connectivity and 
makes the task of synchronizing data between servers 
transparent to them. Synchronization is automated and carried 
out over a disconnection-tolerant messaging layer called 
OCMP [29] which draws inspiration from the research into 
delay-tolerant networking (DTN) [7],[12].   
Because the doctors already view consultation as a matter of 
reaching out to personal contacts, the system is presented as a 
social networking platform – a forum for medical consultation 
with social and professional colleagues – and leverages social 
incentives using principles drawn from the HCI and CSCW 
communities [20].   The system supports two types of 
‘conversations’: highly structured ‘consultations’ for specific 
patients (which work much like an electronic case history) and 
unstructured ‘discussions’ (which work much like online 
 
Figure 1.  GCN distributed, delay-tolerant server network 
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Figure 2. Key elements of GCN’s welcome screen 
 
 
forums). So, for example, a doctor unsure of how to treat a 
particularly resistant case of tuberculosis might fill out various 
fields of the ‘consultation,’ address it to a colleague, and wait 
for advice to be appended to that consultation, whereas 
another interested in general updates on malaria treatment 
might create a question under ‘discussions,’ addressed to any 
interested doctor.  Recognizing the ubiquity of mobile phones, 
GCN also incorporates text message (as well as email) 
notifications of new content; yet the core of the interaction is 
designed for computers.  This is based on feedback during the 
design process that the wealth of data required for patient 
management would demand a screen size larger than those 
present in mobile phones.  
To date, over 125 doctors have been enrolled from Ghana, 
the U.S., Mali, Nigeria, South Africa, and the U.K. and 39 
consultations have been submitted.   
Methodology 
GCN is the product of a conventional user-centered design 
process.  There have been four rounds of iterative design and 
fieldwork, starting with exploratory needs assessment (2005) 
and continuing in conjunction with design exercises (2006-
2007), a pilot deployment (2007), and an ongoing deployment 
(2008).  Overall, interviews or focus groups were conducted 
with 132 doctors in 15 hospitals throughout Ghana [20].   
The most recent fieldwork in Ghana lasted six weeks in 
mid-2008.  Exploratory interviews on mobile phones and 
computer usage were conducted with 35 internal medicine 
(IM) doctors at a major teaching hospital. Further, six 
evaluation interviews at one regional hospital and two 
interviews at one district hospital were conducted (both sites 
of the original pilot). Limitations of the methodology include 
an overrepresentation of internal medicine doctors from urban 
hospitals.  
While the initial rounds of fieldwork focused on rural 
hospitals which are more numerous in the North, the current 
live deployment is centered in the more accessible South, with 
plans to extend later. We have established public servers in 
both Ghana and the US, as well as local servers in 3 major 
hospitals and 2 rural district hospitals in the South. These 
district hospitals suffer from some of the same problems as in 
the North – a shortage of doctors and poor travel and 
communication infrastructure – although the severity of these 
challenges is much less. Our current strategy is first to recruit 
specialists from the major hospitals and to test our system in 
the district hospitals of the South before reaching out to more 
challenged environments in the North. 
C. The OneTouch MedicareLine (ML) 
Solution 
MedicareLine is a program currently offering free calls and 
text messages between any registered physician and/or 
surgeon within Ghana.  Its current focus has been on reducing 
logistical and economic barriers to mobile phone use rather 
than on technological innovation. After submitting the 
required paperwork, a doctor registered with the Ghana 
Medical Association (GMA) receives a OneTouch GSM SIM 
which can be used with a privately-purchased mobile phone.  
Using this SIM, the physician can now call other program 
participants free of personal charge.  For example, a physician 
can call a specialist in the capital or a friend in a rural town to 
ask or provide medical consultation. This can be a significant 
cost saving, especially given that airtime in Ghana is relatively 
expensive compared to many developed countries.  The GMA 
also has a computer terminal that can send “blast” texts to all 
participants for updates and notifications.  
Future phases of the program envision new technological 
interventions (Figure 3).  Phase 2, as yet uncompleted, calls 
for physicians to receive free MMS service so that they can 
augment their phone consultations with photos (e.g., of a skin 
condition or X-ray).  Phase 2 will also allow the GMA and 
other government organizations to collect data from 
physicians via SMS.  In Phase 3, ML anticipates partnering 
with hardware vendors to provide each physician with a 
smartphone preloaded with medical reference software. 
Phase 1 of this program has already experienced a very high 
rate of adoption. Approximately 1700 of 2000 doctors in the 
GMA have enrolled, with over 2 million calls made to date.  
Methodology 
ML arises from a five-week visit to Ghana in October 2007 
and a two-week visit in March 2008.  The purpose of the first 
Table 1 – Comparison of GCN and ML 
 Ghana Consultation Network (GCN) OneTouch MedicareLine (ML) 
Primary platform Computers Mobile phones 
Adoption 89 doctors in 5 hospitals in Ghana 
>125 doctors total from around the world 
>1700 doctors in Ghana 
Problem addressed Network connectivity Cost of cellular airtime 
Target user Doctors in Ghana and Ghanaian medical diaspora Doctors in Ghana 
Partners (see Table 2) Ministry of Health, GPSF, and KNet (ISP) GMA and  OneTouch (mobile operator) 
Assumptions Adequate internet connection quality and coverage 
punctuated by regular power and network outages 
Adequate mobile phone quality and coverage 
Specificity (see Section VI) High – custom system software and Web application Low – only generic mobile phone service 
Deployment strategy Incremental (hospital by hospital) National (available country-wide at launch) 
Figure 3.  ML Phase 1 calls for free phone calls and text messages; the 
planned ML Phase 2 calls for MMS and data reports over SMS, and ML 
Phase 3 calls for free smartphones, reference tools, and custom applications. 
 
 
visit was to introduce and promote usage of a social 
networking Web system for international medical 
collaboration that had already been developed in the States; 
however, within two weeks of arriving in Ghana, the 
investigator decided that access to both computers and the 
Internet was a fundamental problem.  Discarding the Web-
based project entirely, he moved on to exploratory interviews 
with all stakeholders, including over 30 doctors, politicians, 
local businessmen, and administrators, focusing on the issue 
of barriers to communication, innovation, and current 
technology usage. He conducted site visits to five regional 
hospitals and one polyclinic in the urban South, and visited 
Tamale, a northern regional capital, for four days. Towards the 
end of that trip, the investigator orchestrated a “meeting of the 
minds” between the CEO of OneTouch and the head of the 
GMA, whereupon an initial understanding was reached. 
Implementation was left to the two partnering agencies, which 
announced the program the following month and launched it 
in January 2008. In March 2008, the investigator returned to 
conduct another round of unstructured interviews with over 20 
individuals, again from diverse communities, in order to 
assess the program’s progress. 
 In addition to ML’s own follow-up interviews, material for 
this paper also comes from 10 interviews conducted by the 
GCN investigators with doctors at one of the teaching 
hospitals, as well as their interviews with the ML investigator 
directly. 
III. THE ROLE OF PROJECT CONTEXT IN FRAMING PROBLEMS 
ICTD work frequently involves the interdisciplinary 
participation of various communities of research and of 
practice [5], but what are the implications of working within 
these communities, given similar projects with similar goals 
over similar timeframes?  Both projects clearly did some 
amount of fieldwork in both the urban South and the rural 
North, both purportedly wanted to develop a solution that 
would work for all Ghanaian doctors, but GCN focused on 
connectivity in the rural North using innovative technology 
while ML focused on building communication in the urban 
South using proven technology.    In this section, we examine 
the institutional, cultural, and personal contexts from which 
each project arose.  
A. GCN 
GCN began as part of an ongoing collaboration between a 
U.S. corporate research laboratory and a U.S. research 
university.  Specifically, it was a project of a joint research 
group which had worked extensively in the area of low-cost 
connectivity and delay-tolerant networking.  Project funding 
came from U.S. government grants as well as the corporate 
sponsor.  In the first brainstorming/conception phase of this 
project, the axes by which ideas were evaluated were defined 
as: (1) direct social impact (e.g., improvements in healthcare 
delivery), (2) medium-term impact on ICT adoption in 
developing regions (e.g., finding novel ways to make ICT 
more relevant in addressing local problems), and (3) long-term 
contribution towards HCI research.  The primary short-term 
deliverables were software, real deployments, and research 
papers. As for the individual investigators, all came from a 
technology and research background, collectively with 
experience in systems, networks, and HCI.  
B. ML 
ML began as a project funded by a social entrepreneurship 
program and the international health program of the School of 
Medicine at a U.S. research university. As part of the 
international research and education component of a medical 
program, there were no short-term deliverables. The individual 
investigator comes from a medical program with prior 
experience in medical research and a personal interest in 
consumer technology. His personal goal was to identify a 
project with sustainable, wide-spread social impact that had 
the potential to be financially self-sufficient and reproducible 
in other developing countries.    
C. Discussion 
These differing contexts had far-reaching implications for 
how the problem was framed. First, coming from a more 
technological background, GCN investigators were in a better 
position to attempt technological innovations and, in particular 
given their knowledge of projects such as [9] and [22], on 
creative ways of addressing poor connectivity. The ML 
project’s lack of technological expertise limited the possibility 
of developing new technology.  Second, ML, given its ties to a 
major U.S. hospital, had a natural predisposition to tackle 
problems internal to a specialist center, whereas GCN had no 
expertise in hospital administration and hence was more 
inclined to address the simpler logistics of the rural clinic. 
Third, ML’s agenda for large-scale social change predisposed 
it towards impacting the greatest number of doctors, who are 
of course concentrated in the urban South with better mobile 
phone coverage.   GCN chose to focus design efforts on the 
problems of the North (such as those of the 14 doctors 
servicing half a million people in Ghana’s Upper West 
region), seeing this as the best use of limited resources.  These 
different problem framings have various implications for the 
solutions developed and implemented, as we discuss in the 
following sections. 
 
Figure 4.  Timeline of GCN and ML Projects, including fieldwork. 
 
 
IV. PARTNERING STRATEGY AND DEPLOYMENT 
The question of partner selection is a key one for ICTD 
deployments, as partners are the usual means by which 
technology makes it from the laboratory to the field.  In this 
section, we examine the impact of local and non-local partners 
on technology design and deployment.  
A. GCN 
 GCN chose partners based on the decision to deploy 
technology in hospitals to connect their doctors with the 
Ghanaian diaspora (Figure 5).  The Ghana MOH was chosen 
as a local institutional partner because it had the central 
authority to allow the servers to be installed in public 
hospitals. With the initial approval of the MOH, GCN was 
able to work quickly with the public hospitals, conducting 121 
interviews with relatively little trouble alongside iterative, 
incremental deployment of technology.  Of course, the 
drawback of the centralized approach is that it requires 
convincing a risk-averse bureaucracy in advance, thereby 
running the risk of ‘over-selling’ the solution.  In addition to 
the added effort, another unexpected difficulty of working 
through the MOH was overloaded communication channels. 
Advertising GCN to the doctors was a challenge because 
promotional material needed to work through the same 
mechanisms through which the MOH communicated, for 
example, minor procedural changes and optional seminars 
from pharmaceutical companies. So there were multiple 
instances when administration would send out notifications of 
GCN training sessions but only a small fraction of doctors 
would show up.  GCN partnered with the Ghana Physicians 
and Surgeons Foundation (GPSF), a Ghanaian medical 
diaspora organization, to recruit medical consultants in the 
U.S.  KNet, a small Ghanaian Internet service provider (ISP), 
provided local Web hosting. 
B. ML 
ML worked with a smaller number of partners, all non-
governmental (Figure 6).  ML chose the GMA as a local 
institutional partner because it represented the interests of 
physicians and its leaders would immediately see the benefit 
of the project to the physicians as individuals, if not to the 
healthcare system as a whole.  The program is framed as a 
GMA value-added member service (similar to other member 
benefits such as professional development seminars and 
quarterly publications).  In contrast to the MOH information 
channels, doctors took personal initiative to read the GMA 
emails or check GMA bulletin boards; this lead to widespread 
awareness of ML.  OneTouch was chosen as a technological 
service provider for political and pragmatic reasons.  As the 
investigator stated: 
OneTouch was the national company. I wanted this to be 
Ghanaian – by Ghanaians, for Ghanaians. That says a lot 
more than ‘done by Ghanaians in concert with South 
Africans.’ [2] 
OneTouch had the means and the expertise to very quickly 
make the ML program a reality and the financial resources to 
support the program independently on an ongoing basis. Thus, 
while GCN’s deployment was incremental, ML’s was all-or-
nothing, a strategy consistent with ML’s social agenda for 
rapid, wide-scale impact. Of course, the drawback of working 
entirely through OneTouch was that the project was no longer 
under the control of the investigator but was now subject to 
the organizational vagaries of a for-profit corporation.  That is, 
changes in OneTouch’s business priorities could result in the 
program being dropped as quickly as it was initiated. This 
question is immediately salient in light of the recent 
acquisition of OneTouch by a multinational carrier based 
outside of Ghana (in fact, in South Africa). 
C. Discussion 
In considering the non-local partners, GCN and ML bear 
striking similarities in that both were initiated in partnership 
with U.S.-based organizations hoping to foster communication 
with the Ghanaian medical community: GCN with GPSF and 
ML with a U.S. teaching hospital. However, GCN emphasized 
the role of GPSF throughout the course of its lifetime whereas 
ML stopped working with U.S. doctors in order to focus 
explicitly on the Ghanaian context.   The investigator noted: 
Figure 5.  Map of GCN current and anticipated partners. 
Figure 6.  Map of ML current and anticipated partners. 
Table 2 – Healthcare institutions / partners 
Acronym Name and Description 
GMA Ghana Medical Association 
A voluntary association of 95% of Ghana’s doctors, 
representing their interests nationally 
MOH Ministry of Health 
The national health administration, responsible (through the 
Ghana Health Service) for all public hospitals 
GCPS Ghana College of Physicians and Surgeons 
Responsible for specialist education and certification 
GPSF Ghana Physicians and Surgeons Foundation 
U.S.-based non-profit organization promoting specialist 
education in Ghana 
 
 
[B]y removing this component of having this international 
cross dialogue, and realizing that we needed to have intra-
Ghanaian communication instead of inter-Ghanaian 
communication, I quickly came to the conclusion that I 
needed to do something to improve communication within 
Ghana. [2] 
The relevance of overseas medical consultants was ultimately 
one of the core reasons that ML could focus on mobile phones 
while GCN retained a focus on the Internet. With respect to 
deployment, this meant that GCN had the additional task of 
advertising at GPSF conferences in the U.S. and to other 
organizations in the West, diluting its efforts in Ghana. 
GCN’s partnership with the MOH, GPSF and KNet and 
ML’s partnership with the GMA and OneTouch were factors 
in the projects’ very different rates of adoption.  Arriving in 
the country with equipment for the initial pilot deployment, 
GCN was deployed in four hospitals over the course of five 
weeks, garnering an initial user base of 73 doctors. Over a 
similar stretch of five weeks, MedicareLine went from being a 
conversation between two CEOs to a national program, and by 
four months later over 1600 doctors had used ML to make 
over a million phone calls across the country.  
On the topic of sustainability, the juxtaposition of these two 
projects raises some interesting questions surrounding the 
rhetoric of “organic adoption” and its impact on long-term 
sustainability of ICTD initiatives.  That is, they reflect two 
different views of what ‘organic’ or ‘bottom-up’ adoption 
means. 
ML presented a more ‘organic’ adoption model in the sense 
that the program was announced and doctors could sign up 
according to their individual needs and interest.  On the other 
hand, because one institution provides all of the technical and 
financial resources, there is less local ownership and control 
over the maintenance of each project. Essentially, there is no 
guarantee that OneTouch (or the GMA) will not unilaterally 
end the project. This creates a situation analogous to the many 
development projects which rely on inconsistent or limited-
term donor funding.  
GCN’s model involves a more laborious adoption process 
but benefits from complete in-hospital ownership.  This is a 
different type of ‘organic’. This ‘organic’ involved more than 
just the end user; it involves the whole system of people and 
machines that need to be in place for this network to grow. 
Unfortunately, this also surfaces the issue of the lack of access 
to ICT expertise experienced by all but the largest urban 
hospitals; the benefits of decentralized ownership are 
compromised by the geographic concentration of ICT skills.  
GCN can be conceived as a centralized project (sponsored 
by MOH and adopted by hospitals) with decentralized 
deployment (core resources provided by hospitals) while ML 
is a decentralized project (adopted independently by individual 
doctors) with centralized deployment (core resources provided 
by OneTouch).  Technology innovators (such as corporations) 
often exhibit a bias towards decentralized solutions distributed 
through markets. Yet there are many examples, of which GCN 
would be one, of a potentially valuable tool which does not 
become useful until it has sufficient infrastructure and 
“network effects” to fulfill its potential.  Balancing the costs 
and benefits of the approaches remains an open question. 
V. ASSESSING TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
One might think that doing a baseline assessment of 
available technology infrastructure would be one of the most 
objective elements of an ICTD project, one that is a basic part 
of requirements analysis.  In this section, we observe that 
GCN and ML drew on two very different sets of infrastructure 
assumptions and show that such assessments are highly 
influenced by personal and institutional context. 
A. GCN 
The GCN researchers designed the system around the 
pessimistic engineering assumption that the system must 
continue to function under the worst-case connectivity 
conditions in the rural North – i.e., that all options available 
are unreliable and often low-throughput – and optimistic 
assumptions about PC usage.  The exploratory needs 
assessment fieldwork found that the quality of mobile phone 
connectivity was unacceptable in the North. 
It is generally so oversubscribed that if you are calling a 
mobile phone from another service provider, you need to 
dial 10-15 times in order to successfully connect. [1] 
GCN made no quantitative measurement of the quality and 
reliability of network connectivity, instead relying on 
qualitative descriptions of regular power and network outages 
in formulating design requirements.  
With respect to the technology baseline of users, the GCN 
needs assessment found that: 
About a third of the physicians interviewed access email 
regularly… whereas another third claimed that they had at 
some point accessed email regularly. [1] 
Thus, it was expected that only a minority of doctors would 
actually need to acquire computer literacy.  
B. ML 
The ML researcher made optimistic assumptions about 
mobile phone connectivity among its user base and pessimistic 
assumptions about PC usage.  As with GCN, connectivity was 
assessed qualitatively, drawing on experiences during the 
four-day trip to the North wherein calls from a OneTouch 
phone were compared with calls from another provider. While 
there were occasions of calls dropped or text messages 
delayed, ML concluded that the quality was sufficient for most 
basic uses.  
With regards to computer literacy, ML concluded that: 
The daily routine of a physician in Ghana does not revolve 
around computers. I can’t go a day as a physician [in the 
U.S.]... without using a computer – taking orders to 
checking lab values – but in Ghana it’s all people ordered, 
from medical records to orders, operative notes… 
Everything is done by paper! [2] 
These observations are actually consistent with those of GCN, 
but what gives these findings an added dimension is the ability 
of the ML researcher to make a direct comparison of this 
 
 
environment with his experience in a leading hospital in the 
U.S. Thus, while GCN framed its findings as “most doctors do 
indeed have some experience with computers” and would use 
them more often given better access, ML concluded that 
“computers are not part of the daily routine of a Ghanaian 
physician” and so are not a useful option.  
C. Discussion 
Part of the difficulty in producing consistent assessments of 
conditions on the ground is that while metrics such as the 
frequency of power outages and the availability of DSL can be 
measured and mapped in great detail, it is up to each 
investigator to determine exactly what metrics need to be 
measured, how rigorous the measurement needs to be, and 
what quality of service constitutes something usable by the 
target community for the specific application. GCN had no 
resources or expertise with which to improve the mobile 
phone infrastructure, so it focused more on network 
infrastructure. ML had no expertise with network 
infrastructure, but instead saw an opportunity to address a very 
significant, non-technical barrier in mobile phone usage.  
A closer look at the details of connectivity suggests that 
both projects were somewhat optimistic in downplaying the 
infrastructural limitations. The qualitative assessments verified 
expected connectivity barriers, whereas additional issues 
remained hidden. 
GCN anticipated power outages and network 
disconnections occurring several times a day, but the 
regularity with which (nominally acceptable) bandwidth was 
unusably low was a surprise.  For example, certain pieces of 
systems software on the local servers needed to be configured 
with estimates of the worst-case time needed to transfer an 
8KB file chunk; the initial estimate of 20 seconds (~3.3Kb/s) 
was eventually increased to 5 minutes (~0.2Kb/s).   
Connectivity data obtained after the deployment of GCN show 
that the difference between best- and worst-case performance 
can be extreme.  Figures 7, 8 and 9 illustrate the volatility of 
network performance at three sample hospitals.  Figure 7 
shows a DSL network connection with moderately variable 
packet loss rates and round trip times. However, Figure 8 
illustrates the case of a satellite connection so overloaded that, 
on weekdays between 10:00 AM and 4:00 PM, packet round-
trip times to the public GCN server in Ghana consistently 
exceeded 10 seconds and loading google.com took 15 
minutes. While the GCN software was successfully able to 
transmit doctors’ messages when congestion decreased in the 
evening, a doctor who requested a consultation in the morning 
would wait until the following day to receive a response (even 
if the consultant responded immediately upon receipt of a 
message).  (The irony here is that this hospital, with the largest 
number of dedicated IT staff - 6 people - thus experienced the 
most apparent ‘outages’.)  In contrast, Figure 9 shows the 
characteristics of a satellite connection that worked reliably 
and consistently.  
As ML is not based on Internet connectivity, an analogous 
examination of ML’s assessment of mobile phone coverage 
would require assessing the quality of service of OneTouch 
voice calls and text messages.  While we do not have this 
information, we can look instead at geographical coverage 
(Figure 10).  While OneTouch has more coverage than any 
other provider in Ghana, the coverage map shows that vast 
regions of the country remain out of coverage area, leaving 
doctors working in those regions at a significant disadvantage. 
Clearly, a trip to a single urban center in the North does not 
systematically gauge the limitations of coverage throughout 
the country, let alone quality of service within current 
coverage areas.  
To be clear, the issues illustrated above have not been a 
cause of project failure in either case.  Further, exhaustive  
Figure 10.  OneTouch GSM Coverage Areas.  (Source: GSM Association) 
  
Figure 7.  Urban Hospital (DSL), Wed-Tue Figure 8. Teaching Hospital (VSAT), Thu-Wed Figure 9.  Rural Hospital (VSAT), Mon-Thu 
Packet Loss Rates (%) and Round-Trip Average (ms.) for three hospital servers in Ghana. Left y axis shows median, 5th and 95th percentile of RTA. 
 
 
quantitative assessment of all such issues in advance of 
deployment is not always cost-effective or even possible (for 
example, one cannot measure DSL links that are not installed).  
What we suggest here is that care must be taken to prevent 
“blind spots” in assessing infrastructure and that such blind 
spots can arise from the investigators’ backgrounds. 
VI. SOLUTION USAGE AND APPROPRIATION 
In this section, we discuss the usage of the technological 
solutions that arose from each project as well as the ways in 
which the solutions were appropriated for uses other than 
those they were intended to enable.  We then discuss the role 
of what we call technological specificity in these processes. 
A. GCN  
As described previously, GCN adoption has been relatively 
slow; what is notable is that GCN experienced a better rate of 
adoption in the smaller hospitals than in the large ones.  At the 
smallest deployment hospital, with only 2 doctors on staff, one 
of the doctors continues to log into the system and post cases 
on a roughly bi-weekly basis. In the mid-sized hospitals, the 
response was mixed, with a handful of doctors using the 
system every week or two but the majority losing interest. At 
the largest deployment hospital, however, after the initial 
flurry of activity surrounding the presentations and training, 
none of the doctors continued to use it on a consistent basis. 
Follow-up interviews shed some light on this disparity.  
One issue was computer access. In the smallest district 
hospital, the doctors shared one computer, but since there were 
only two doctors, having access to the computer was never a 
problem.  In contrast, access to computers was an issue at the 
larger hospitals. One doctor said: 
Sometimes you go to the library, you see someone at the 
computer for 15 minutes; you don’t have that time to waste 
[waiting for the computer]. 
Another issue was the match between the system’s use case 
and the needs of the pilot participants.  Through its design and 
pool of GPSF consultants, GCN had targeted general 
practitioners (GPs) in the North who wished to consult with 
urban and overseas medical specialists.  This matched the 
needs of district hospital doctors in the South who had no 
ready access to specialist consultation and saw great value in 
the ability to connect with specialists (either in Ghana or 
overseas).  The popularity of this system in the district 
hospitals is a very promising precedent for future deployments 
in the more rural North. In contrast, physicians at the larger 
Southern hospitals could speak and consult with other doctors 
and specialists more easily in-person than over the computer.  
GCN did not address the needs of urban specialists looking to 
tap into the global community of sub-specialists.  (In 
evaluation interviews, many of the urban doctors requested a 
greater number of sub-specialists within the system.) 
GCN Appropriation 
Beyond the expected use for consultation, there were 
unanticipated uses of the system. First, 6 of the 39 
‘conversations’ observed were purely social in nature. This 
was surprising in light of how ‘medicalized’ the investigators 
perceived the interface. Yet perhaps because their means of 
communicating with remote doctors are so limited, it appears 
the barriers between profession and person are much more 
fluid than anticipated. Second, many of the doctors discussed 
and requested functionality in the system for sharing literature 
and PowerPoint presentations, to the extent that these features 
were included in the upgrade from the pilot to the ongoing 
deployment. This is consistent with the findings mentioned 
earlier that a larger screen size was important in dealing with 
more information-intensive tasks, and also provides insight 
into the kind of tasks matched to a computer’s affordances. 
B. ML  
As previously noted, ML experienced an incredible rate of 
adoption, with 1700 of 2000 members of the GMA signing up 
within the first four months.  While there are no statistics 
available concerning the fraction of usage that is related to 
consultation, there is little doubt (judging from the interviews 
and from multiple instances of observing doctors as they 
received calls) that ML is used frequently for consultation. 
There are multiple reasons for this popularity, some of 
which are hard to distinguish from the affordances and 
popularity of mobile phones themselves.  (One doctor claimed 
his phone bill dropped from 150 USD per month to 8 USD per 
month after joining the program.)  First, mobile phones are a 
popular medium for medical consultation because the real-
time nature of voice calls is often critical to treating an 
emergency case – the three doctors who volunteered 
information on the breakdown of emergency/non-emergency 
cases reported that around 80% of cases that require further 
consultation are indeed emergency cases. One said: 
I prefer phone calls to SMS, because I prefer an immediate 
answer, and also so I can make sure the phone is on. If I’m 
dealing with a case right now, I want to know what to do 
when moving ahead as soon as possible. 
Second, phone skills are more widespread than computer 
skills. Because mobile phones are practically ubiquitous in 
Ghana, there is a lower learning curve as opposed to 
computers, which are owned by only one in three doctors. A 
few doctors claimed that texting on a mobile phone was easier 
than typing on a keyboard. While many of the junior doctors 
demonstrated great proficiency with both typing and texting – 
the vast majority sent multiple text messages a day – a few of 
the senior doctors demonstrated great difficulty typing during 
training sessions.  Third, it promotes more tightly-integrated 
workflows.  One doctor said:  
I use [ML] a lot and I think it is wonderful. If you want to 
talk to anybody concerning a case… concerning anything 
relating to your practice... it gives you a chance to relax 
and really talk. It’s so good. It’s a wonderful idea. 
Another said: 
There has been a move to ban mobile phones in certain 
hospitals. It is a very very big mistake, because all they are 
going to realize is that this is actually going to decrease 
 
 
efficiency rather. Consultation is not going to be working 
as well as it used to. 
ML Appropriation 
ML was originally framed as a system to ensure continuity 
of care in long-term and referral patients, but after the system 
had been established for three months the ML investigator 
noticed its emergent effect in fostering camaraderie in the 
medical community.  He said: 
I was talking to doctors and they were telling me. “Yeah, 
I’m reconnecting with classmates.”  
Indeed, many doctors were up-front about the fact that ML 
had been a boon, not just for consultation, but for facilitating 
social interaction within their community. 
The mobile phone has also integrated itself into 
administrative and management processes within large 
hospitals. One doctor said: 
You don’t have walk down somewhere or you send a 
patient down... it reduces the whole bureaucratic... 
pushing around of patients. 
Personal mobile phones, both on the ML program and not, are 
regularly used to set up diagnostic tests at the laboratory, to 
confirm insurance claims forms, and also for the doctor on call 
during the night to discuss a change in a patient’s care with the 
doctor who admitted that patient.  In short, where a U.S. 
hospital might use infrastructure such as pagers and site-wide 
internal communications systems, large Ghanaian hospitals 
improvised solutions using personal mobile phones.  
C. Discussion 
In reflecting upon differences between GCN and ML in 
usage and appropriation, we will focus on an important 
distinction that we will call ‘specificity’.  Two solutions with 
different ‘specificity’ can be targeted at exactly the same task 
and be based on an equally nuanced understanding of 
workflows and use cases; the difference lies in the types and 
number of layers of technology which make up the solution 
and the degree to which they are specific to the solution.  For 
example, the GCN system presents not only a robust 
asynchronous communication medium, but also an in-hospital 
server as well as an end-user Web application. ML, in its first 
phase, focuses exclusively on tackling the cost barrier of 
existing phones using existing networks.  
As we have seen, these two projects with similar goals at 
the start ultimately resulted in two very different usage 
outcomes – particular in the area of adoption. Investing time 
and resources in needs assessments and design process, the 
GCN project produced a highly ‘specific’ system to address 
not only failures in internet infrastructure but also social 
network gaps.  However, adoption has been slowed by the 
need to introduce the system incrementally into hospitals.  The 
ML project achieved broader adoption over a much shorter 
period of time, in part by relying on the existing availability 
and high adoption levels of mobile phones. Similarly, the 
lower specificity of the ML solution seems to contribute to a 
greater range of user appropriation behaviors. 
While it is tempting to conclude that providing solutions 
with lower specificity is strictly more desirable – and in many 
cases it may be more desirable – it must also be remembered 
that utility comes in many forms.  GCN’s higher degree of 
specificity is due to multiple factors.  First, the social 
networking application is required to meet the GCN goal of 
enabling isolated doctors to build social capital in an extended 
geographic network of colleagues.  While ML assumed that 
the doctors that needed to work together already had each 
other’s mobile phone numbers, GCN had determined that a 
large portion of rural, immigrant, and junior doctors did not 
have a strong network of contacts [20]. Second, GCN’s 
emphasis on overseas consultants implies a need for low-
bandwidth, asynchronous communication as opposed to voice 
calls.  Third, GCN operated as a development project, 
maintaining statistics of usage metrics in order to facilitate 
evaluation; for now, ML relies entirely on the built-in 
reporting mechanisms in the OneTouch network.  GCN can 
map consultations made to specific case outcomes, while 
OneTouch – which does receive very high praise from 
enrolled doctors who offered their feedback on the system – 
cannot.   Moreover, as previously mentioned, GCN’s goals 
include technological innovation as well as social impact.  
GCN assumes connectivity in rural areas will remain an 
ongoing challenge, while ML relies on the assumption that, 
with time, OneTouch coverage will be able to reach even the 
most remote doctors. This question echoes one of the 
fundamental tensions in ICTD research: as pragmatists, we 
aspire towards demonstrating the greatest social impact in real 
communities today, while as researchers, we try to identify 
what fundamental limitations exist and how these can be 
tackled in years to come.  It is to be expected that untested 
technology would experience more hurdles in the short run, 
while its long-term contribution is yet to be seen.  In short, 
then, a project can easily have a number of goals that might be 
frustrated by a lower-specificity solution.  
A final note about lower-specificity solutions concerns their 
potential to be too widely appropriated.  In the smallest district 
hospital (where GCN experienced greater adoption), both 
doctors tended to switch off or mute their phones while at the 
hospital in order to minimize distraction. Even in the larger 
urban hospitals, half of the 20 doctors who discussed their 
mobile phone usage claimed to keep their phones off while 
working because of distraction.  Hospital administrators have 
related concerns; at one teaching hospital, a memorandum was 
circulated to all the doctors banning the use of mobile phones 
in many locations 
…to forestall the negative impact of mobile phone 
frequencies on medical equipments and improve the work 
ethics of staff. It is also announced… that it is a serious 
offence to disconnect life-supporting equipment in order to 
use their power sources (socket) to charge mobile phones. 
In view of concerns such as these, we suggest that researchers 
keep in mind both the (immediate) benefits and (eventual) 
costs of rapid adoption. 
 
 
VII. RELATED WORK 
ICTDs for Healthcare in the Developing World 
The research on ICTDs to promote healthcare has a long 
and rich history [15],[34]. In the context of developing 
regions, remote medical consultation has been a popular and 
relatively successful approach [32]. Computers [3], mobile 
phones [25] and a combination of both [27] have demonstrated 
utility in a variety of settings.  
Framing the Problem 
[21] provides a useful overview and categorization of how 
ICTs are conceptualized from a variety of different fields. 
Theory on ‘framing the problem’ can be drawn from social-
constructivism, although we are not advocating here for a 
change from ICTD’s traditional focus on pragmatism and 
advocacy/participatory research. Much of the work on 
qualitative methodology emphasizes the importance of 
reflexivity and self-awareness in order to minimize such bias 
[8], but the fact remains there are institutional accountabilities 
which no amount of methodology can shake. We can learn 
from the example of anthropologists who have challenged 
their own role in the colonial apparatus [11],[30]. For 
example, [17] provides an interesting comparison of how 
different sectors tackle the management of kiosks in India. 
Partnerships and Deployment 
ICTD researchers have an important role to play at the 
crossroads of business administration and government policy, 
identifying how both contribute to the goal of development 
and how their contributions interplay. Many examples in 
ICTD research and development literature study the role of 
institutional players, although these papers are typically 
evaluative rather than action-oriented [18],[23],[24]. The 
literature on partnership selection and cultivation in ICTD is 
small but growing rapidly [26],[28],[31]. 
Specificity 
In reaction to the variable success of many deployments of 
general ICT, such as a number of telecenter and ‘hole-in-the-
wall’ computing initiatives, much of the focus of the HCI 
ICTD research community has turned towards purpose-built 
technology [4],[33].  Many of those doing systems research 
focus instead on providing basic computing or connectivity 
functionality [13],[29]. [6] presents a useful survey of ICTD 
literature which mentions a pre-1999 trend towards non-
specific technologies such as connectivity and a post-1999 
trend towards specific solutions such as software and VOIP. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have presented parallel case studies of two 
ICT projects addressing the need for improved medical 
consultation among doctors in Ghana.  We have examined 
how the two projects have been shaped by the institutional 
context and the identity of their researchers. We looked at how 
the partnerships formed affect the solution outcome, delivery, 
and adoption; we argued that even the task of assessing 
technological infrastructure is far from objective; and we 
noted the implications of the ‘specificity’ of each solution.    
 We conclude with an open question raised by these 
discussions, summarized in Table 3.  In ICTD research, much 
attention has been given to the socio-cultural, political, and 
economic contexts of target communities – yet ‘difference’ is 
a measure between communities; it is only by critically 
examining our own research community that we can 
understand the influence and impact of communities on each 
other.  ICTD is linked with economic, social, political, and 
human development agendas [6].  Regardless of whether we 
take an integrated approach [10] or focus instead on specific 
local needs [14], there are still institutional, societal, and 
individual layers at play in our interventions.  Researchers are 
embedded in contexts of existing friendships, collaborations, 
expertise and agendas, and we need to be conscious of what 
kind of consequences our decisions to draw on them have on 
project outcomes. In this paper we have seen impacts on 
everything from research agendas to infrastructure 
assumptions, yet the literature on these avenues of choice 
remain fragmented across a variety of other communities 
including CSCW and organizational behavior. ICTD 
researchers need to increase the exchange of ideas between 
these communities.  For example, in the course of establishing 
GCN, the task of generating a viable ‘business model’ for the 
technology providers was not addressed, but a social 
entrepreneurship community would never allow such an 
omission.  ML has had great adoption success, but technical 
infrastructure for evaluating its impact was neglected. We 
need a theoretical framework under which to unite the 
different fields of research for ICTD practitioners, one 
surrounding not just technology design, but also technology 
framing, partnership, assumptions, and deployment. 
Table 3 – Impacts of project context on project decisions and outcomes 
Framing By focusing on connectivity in the rural North, GCN targets a minority of doctors with the greatest need.  
By focusing on airtime cost, ML impacts the majority of doctors, the bulk of whom are in the urban South. 
Partnerships and 
Deployment 
Working through MOH allowed GCN to iterate rapidly with many hospitals early on, but with greater overhead later. GCN`s 
commitment to the U.S.-based GPSF was a key factor that tied it to a computer-based platform instead of mobile phones.  
GMA advertised ML effectively while OneTouch quickly took ownership of project execution and maintenance.  ML’s approach is 
highly dependent on the vagaries of a single national operator while GCN’s is at the mercy of individual hospitals. 
Infrastructure GCN found the networks to be more challenged than anticipated. 
ML found mobile phone coverage lower than anticipated. 
Solution GCN`s higher specificity allowed it to incorporate evaluation indicators and address not only physical communication gaps but also 
gaps in social capital. Usage limited by access to computers in larger hospitals.   
ML adoption was much higher given the real-time nature of mobile phones and the fact that they were already widely tested and used. 
Lower specificity facilitated adoption and appropriation while making it difficult to evaluate the program.   
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